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The Right to Misrepresent
Donald Denoon
Depicting past events has always been problematic, but historiography
(analyzing those problems) used to be treated as a mainly technical exer-
cise. Post-structural and postcolonial critiques (well articulated in Neu-
mann 1992) have revived historiography’s moral and political content.
When historians brought up before cultural studies change gear, however,
they often produce grating and clashing sounds, unlike the smooth auto-
matic transmission of a younger generation. The ambiguities of the term
represent compound the problems of writing about other people with the
perception that they also claim to speak for them. When historians are
citizens of former colonial powers, and their academic subjects were colo-
nial subjects, academic discourse becomes emotionally supercharged (eg,
Linnekin 1991). To write about other people involves sensitivity, but to
speak on their behalf is to claim contestable moral rights.
I am indebted to Nicholas Thomas for advice on navigating this mine-
field. One of his broad-ranging critiques of academic writing concludes
that
Pacific historians should continue to tell stories, repeat the stories told by
indigenous urban and rural historians, document the events of contact, and
discover lost texts; but these pursuits could be given a new salience to social,
cultural, and political debates through a more expansive view of Pacific history
as a series of local expressions of a broader colonial history. (1990, 157–158)
My story has often been told by its author, and repeated by me as gossip,
before I recognized it as discourse. It is a matter of wry pride to Sailosi
Atiu that one of his most creative tasks as a bureaucrat was to persuade
international agencies that the Oceanic republic of Tiko was among the
twenty poorest countries on earth. Governments in this category enjoyed
privileged access to aid funds, so it was a highly prized condition. Tiko
might seem an implausible candidate, given the fertility of its soil and
people, their global opportunities for travel, employment, and enjoyment400
dialogue • denoon 401via America and New Zealand, high rates of schooling and tertiary
education, and a serious shortage of emaciated mendicants. Sailosi hurdled
these barriers by sheer intellectual endeavor and divergent thinking.
Ninety-eight percent literacy seemed a fatal disability until agreement was
reached that literacy in the vernacular should not count. Rigorous exami-
nations in English virtually abolished literacy. The living standards of
Tikong families were bolstered by remittances from family members work-
ing abroad. This grave advantage became a priceless deficit by treating
transfers as evidence of international dependency and abject domestic
poverty. Conversely, an apparent handicap—the absence of statisticians
to measure social and economic indices—was the decisive card in this
game of asset stripping.
In this story, names have been changed to protect people whose guilt or
innocence is difficult to judge. I have heard it twice as a thigh-slapping
joke, during well-lubricated parties in the Tikong capital. As the elements
of the narration have not changed over twenty years, I incline to believe
it. I would believe it even without such evidence, because I want to believe
that the periphery sometimes defeats the metropolitan center, that the vil-
lager can outwit the urban sophisticate, and that the rationalist rhetoric
of econometrics can be turned to perverse advantage. I would believe it
even if it were not true, such is its appeal to my partialities. And I believe
it although I am not sure what it means. In miniature, my uncertainty
about meanings reflects scholarship in the islands.
Kerry Howe (1977) has been the most articulate speaker for the liberal,
upbeat, island-oriented history that this story may exemplify. His crusade
against “fatal impact” interpretations denounced them as usually “the
product of over-fertile and perhaps guilt-ridden imaginations.” Against
that doom-laden perspective he championed “an active, initiative-taking
savage whose way of life was not necessarily ravaged by European con-
tact.” That works wonderfully as description but (as Howe’s critics have
complained) it ignores structural constraints on individual and societal
agency. Island-oriented perspectives mislead if they “down-size” Euro-
peans (Vicki Lukere’s felicitous phrase) and the power they did and do
wield. Sailosi won this trick, but the World Bank makes the rules and—as
the banker—wins most of the games.
On the subject of games, a digression into the contemporary labor
trade suggests the limits of Islander agency. The irruption of modern
entertainment capital into the “traditional” domain of rugby football
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land and Australia. With pitifully few television sets, Islanders cannot
influence the modalities of entertainment production or distribution. Indi-
vidual players come on board for recruitment and performance fees that
are prodigious by island standards—but they spend the prime of their
lives in Huddersfield or Townsville. Like their plantation predecessors,
most are young men, removed from their social and cultural networks,
recruited for a contract period calibrated to their physique, and earning
less than their white fellow-workers with traditions of unionization.
More often than Sailosi, these active, “initiative-taking savages” win
games, but as players they represent Wigan or the Canberra Raiders more
often than their countries of origin. Media networks make the rules that
govern their working lives, shape the culture of the job, and constrain
their benefits.
A more recent analytical paradigm, which enjoys the acronym mirab,
has been built from government statistics, mainly by geographers and
development consultants (eg, Ogden 1994; Connell 1991). It concedes
that migration does offer poor people access to international resources,
yet their behavior perpetuates unequal relationships internationally, inso-
far as small nations depend on migration, remittances and aid to sustain a
bureaucracy, and these mechanisms trap societies in dependent relations
with foreign countries. In this scenario neither the football stars Noa
Nadruku and Willie Ofahengaue, nor the bureaucrat Sailosi Atiu deserves
more than a footnote, because they exercise agency of little consequence.
They are not exceptions to dependency but its manifestation—even per-
haps its sinews.
Epeli Hau‘ofa, the Tikong chronicler (1988), is in real life a creative
scholar, whose “Our Sea of Islands” (1993) is an explicit challenge to
mirab, to dependency theory, and to pessimism. The essay emphasizes
Islanders’ historical connectedness and the disjunction between govern-
ment affairs and the transnational dynamics of (some) families. He also
questions the motives for representing island societies as poor, small,
remote, and developmentally hopeless, and points to the damage inflicted
by this portrayal on Islanders’ self-esteem. A judgment implicit in this
essay is spelt out in “Pasts to Remember”:
In order for us to gain greater autonomy than we have today and to maintain
it within the global system, we must in addition to other measures, be able to
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tinue to rely heavily on others to do it for us because autonomy cannot be
attained through dependence. (Hau‘ofa 1994)
Because research and scholarship sustain public representation and dif-
fusely inform public policy, real consequences flow from them. But the
question is broader than the right to advise governments. The representa-
tion debate has been conducted mainly by anthropologists in the discur-
sive terms of their discipline, but the issue affects all the humanities and
social sciences.
Of many striking reflections, not least is Hau‘ofa’s tacit rejection of
political analysis as a profession, and his insistence (echoing Eco 1986)
that it is a civic obligation. History is both the most natural of popular
narrative forms and the least esoteric branch of scholarship. Here profes-
sional and civic debates mingle and mangle each other. The greater part of
popular history-making takes place, of course, among “indigenous urban
and rural historians” beyond the hearing of academics, but there is a space
to which popular and academic historians both lay claim: Islanders on the
grounds of citizenship, scholars by rights and obligations that may need
to be clarified. Because of the intimate links between citizenship and rep-
resentation, the most passionate critics of mainstream academia are mem-
bers of politically “encapsulated” societies. They publish scholarship of
awesome political power, fueled by the denial of their collective sover-
eignty (and hence their individual citizenship). Consider for example Lili-
kalâ Kame‘eleihiwa’s review of Gananath Obeyesekere’s The Apotheosis
of Captain Cook:
The noted Hawaiian scholar Haunani-Kay Trask often dismisses Cook as “a
syphilitic, tubercular racist,” and when I teach that part of Hawaiian history I
relate to my students that he brought venereal disease, violence, and, eventu-
ally, an unrelenting wave of foreigners, once his journals had been published
in Europe. (Kame‘eleihiwa 1994, 111)
Indigenous participation in academic debate is uneven. In many societies
—notably Hawai‘i, Aotearoa, Fiji, Tonga, and Western Sâmoa—Hau‘ofa
is preaching to the converted. His concerns are already addressed in the
normal knockabout forum of publications and reviews, but mainly as
amendments and critiques of the writings of outsiders. Elsewhere nonciti-
zens dominate academic debate more completely, despite (for example)
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South Pacific to nurture and publish Islander scholars. Not only do for-
eign scholars dominate by weight of tomes. By default they set agendas.
Island-orientation and mirab are fully imported perspectives. This persis-
tent imbalance provokes soul-searching among foreign scholars (eg, Howe
1977; Routledge 1985) and irritation among those insiders whose imme-
diate concerns deny them the chance to publish.
Is it possible to identify distinguishing features of academic history
written by citizens of independent island states? Some are consequences
of institutional influences like place of employment and access to pub-
lishers. Otherwise a striking attribute is that Islanders commonly write on
a smaller geographic scale than outsiders. I recall no Islander tackling the
whole region at book length, in the manner of Spate (1979, 1983, 1988),
Howe (1984), Scarr (1990), Campbell (1991), or Howe, Kiste, and Lal
(1994). Hau‘ofa’s “Our Sea of Islands” stands alone as a regionwide
essay of power and perception. John Waiko’s general history of Papua
New Guinea (1993) is singular as a general history that encompasses a
multiethnic country, and it may be significant that it is essentially policy
history, offering little scope for the insights that illuminate the narrower
Binandere landscape of his doctoral thesis (Waiko 1982). August Kituai’s
doctoral thesis, “My Gun, My Brother” (1994), is national in focus,
though limited to one key institution. Few national histories have a single
author, except Sione Lâtûkefu’s Church and State in Tonga (1974). Many
other national histories are composite—Kiribati: Aspects of History with
25 authors (Talu 1979), Lagaga with 13 (Meleiseâ and Schoeffel 1987),
Tuvalu: A History with 17 (Laracy 1983), or Niue with 12 (Hekau 1982).
Just as Oceania rouses more enthusiasm in outsiders than in Oceanians,
the independent nations are difficult to anatomize for writers who locate
themselves in ethnic communities. For Western Sâmoa, where ethnicity
and sovereignty almost converge, island authors suffer great difficulty in
focusing on a state that tends to be overshadowed by society. In his
preface to Lagaga: A Short History of Modern Samoa, Meleiseâ outlined
some differences between western and Samoan views of history:
For Samoans, knowledge is power, and the most powerful knowledge is his-
torical knowledge: treasured and guarded in people’s heads, in notebooks
locked in boxes and matai’s briefcases or with their precious mats under mat-
tresses. The valuable histories of families, lands, genealogies, villages and
events long ago are family property. (Meleiseâ and Schoeffel 1987, vii)
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ble western histories in method and narrative form, because they use the
same sorts of written sources. In order to write an integrated narrative,
“we have little of the great, rich fund of historical information of our
people. . . . We have relied extensively on facts from documentary sources.”
It is difficult otherwise to find “common” threads, and arbitrary to total-
ize innumerable family histories into a common narrative.
Conversely for Irian Jaya, Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, and per-
haps Vanuatu and New Caledonia, a focus on the state makes it almost
impossible to embrace the experience of most of the people who lived be-
yond the writ of government. (Fiji is a notable exception, to which I
return.) In this context it is worth remembering that the disjunction
between state-focused and people-focused scholarship reflects the poor fit
between island people and their colonial and postcolonial governments.
Where else are there states, the majority of whose citizens live abroad?
And where, except in Sâmoa, does a national community not merely tol-
erate but relish its partition into an independent republic and a dependent
territory of the United States?
Scholarship rooted in citizenship or ethnicity is not only likely to be
narrow in focus: it is almost certain to insist on the uniqueness of its sub-
ject matter, resisting general statements of the kind a cosmopolitan agenda
seeks to advance. Unless historians are careful or lucky, they endorse a
division of labor in which foreign scholars tackle cosmic issues, sketching
the big picture and leaving to Islanders the joining up of the dots. This
division of labor would perpetuate the colonial paradigm whereby the
internationally recognized state is presumed to know better than its paro-
chial subjects. The trick is not to shelve the large questions, but to ensure
that the big picture is not privileged over the small-scale study.
In other respects, island scholars research and write according to much
the same canons that apply to everyone else: points of disagreement are
limited and are not the focus of complaint. To imagine the disquiet that
some feel in the present situation, suppose that the leading American and
Australian history books are written in Japanese. The full texts are freely
available to anyone who can read them, and they form the basis for
public education and policy development. Summary versions are available
in translation and modified to serve as school texts. Any scholar may
freely join the debate—in Japanese. The scholarship is framed by a master
narrative beginning with Amaterasu and ending with nanshin-ron. This
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throws much surprising and lurid light on Australian experience, but it is
necessarily deaf to significant areas of consciousness, and it neither com-
mands popular acceptance nor engages the demotic narratives of every-
day life. This is substantially the situation confronting Islander intellec-
tuals, who listen with mounting exasperation while other people talk
about them, whether the talk is well- or mis-informed. The problem lies
largely in the institutions and structures of academic authority rather than
the qualities of foreign scholars. However, until Islanders take leading
parts in delineating their own experience, foreign scholars will continue
to research and write in an uneasy moral and political space.
Another story: In 1995, Vilsoni Hereniko of the University of Hawai‘i
delivered a public lecture at the University of the South Pacific, on aca-
demic imperialism. More trenchantly than the gentle Hau‘ofa, Hereniko
denounced the distorting and undermining consequences that follow from
“the other” delineating “the native.” He illustrated this theme by con-
trasting a variety of westerners who misunderstood “the native,” with
several “natives” whose self-knowledge was exemplary. He was generous
in praise of Alan Howard’s archival research on Rotuma (Hereniko’s
birthplace), while insisting that knowledge gained in these ways must be
imperfect. As short-term remedies, he proposed that Islanders should
respond to or review foreigners’ writings (which seems an excellent idea)
and that foreign scholars should associate Islanders in their research and
writing (which seems likely to blur responsibility). Something in his style
of presentation—his critical references to Sahlins, Linnekin, and Dening,
or the combative rhetoric of some members of the University of Hawai‘i
—prompted his audience to prove their personal innocence. One woman
agreed that “the west” was complicit in misrepresenting Islanders, but
added that the west (as an innately masculine structure) equally misrepre-
sented women. Several other analyses were offered, all claiming shared
victimhood. For me, the climax was a statement by a gentleman and
scholar whose innocence was proven by his origin in the north of England
(the west being manifestly a London creature). By the end of question
time, aging, white, male, tenured historians of the Pacific were lost for
words. I could have mentioned that I had not successfully represented
anyone in recent weeks, but that seemed more likely to cloud than to
clarify the issue.
This is not a personal problem, nor is it confined to the Pacific, nor
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politan anthropology” (1994) tackled precisely these issues of representa-
tion. He drew a bead on a new Greek association of social anthropolo-
gists, which debated “whether foreign anthropologists . . . could become
regular members [of the association] and also whether folklorists who
were originally trained in Greece but studied ethnology or anthropology
abroad could also become members.” This motion illustrates how a dis-
tinction between native and foreign researcher leads swiftly to privileging
some natives over others, in a hierarchy of authenticity. The claim that
only natives can understand natives leads to the proposition that only
natives should try, then to indices of credibility, and ultimately perhaps to
licenses. In Kuper’s view, this is a short step beyond the “orthodoxies of
the previous decades” in cultural anthropology. Its faith in innate cultural
characteristics also reminded him ominously of the discredited tradition
of Volkskunde.
Kuper’s desire to revive “the enlightenment project of a science of
human variation in time and space” is explicitly opposed to the thrust of
cultural anthropology since Franz Boas—notably its tragic divorce from
other social sciences. Anyone who endorses an enlightenment project,
however, must address the likely criticism that such endeavors reek of
precisely the totalizing ambition that frames and marginalizes Islanders’
lives as numerically trivial and intellectually peculiar. At least three cur-
rent projects illustrate this danger. A committee of distinguished British
historians (albeit including one American) is editing an authoritative
account of the British Empire. Australian, New Zealand, and Oceanic his-
tories are predictably subsets, given a place, but seated even farther from
the British high table than India or Africa. Meanwhile unesco—an organ-
ization often accused of third-worldism—is producing a multivolume his-
tory to illuminate the “impact of trends in science and cultural develop-
ment primarily in the West . . . leading to indigenous responses and
advances,” according to its instructions to authors. Having allocated
leading roles to the west, the enterprise distinguishes varieties of “cultural
responses,” including “efforts . . . to evolve a scientific, rationalist out-
look in the context of their own cultures [and] the emergence of alterna-
tive responses.” If even unesco is confident that the west is the fount of
rational approaches, how much surer are other institutions? Blackwells is
engaged in a seventeen-volume history of the world, of which Australia,
New Zealand, and Oceania constitute volume 17. Clearly “a science of
408 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997human variation over time and space” could readily degenerate into
another Eurocentric master narrative.
Sharing Kuper’s cosmopolitan ambition, can I allay these suspicions?
Proceeding by analogy, what topics might Americans or Australians seek
from Japanese scholars, in the fanciful scenario that they dominate Amer-
ican and Australian scholarship? A host of useful topics would demand
their attention. Perhaps most important would be to unmask the hydra-
headed structures of imperial authority and dissect the dynamics of un-
equal economic relations. Metropolitan scholars would be well placed to
deconstruct the mythologies that always clothe naked colonial power,
and they could go on to analyze gender relations in situations where
power relations are explicitly unequal. As a matter of courtesy as well as
prudence, Japanese scholars might be expected to represent other people’s
perceptions tentatively, and to resist the temptation of synthesizing a
“native point of view” that would preempt the full range of native narra-
tives and critiques. In brief, they might be asked not to claim to under-
stand the natives, nor to lump them together, and never to patronize.
If this is what Others should do unto us historians, is this how to nego-
tiate with Others? The negotiating context is deeply disfigured by colo-
nialism—conquest, expropriation, and alien administration, allocating to
Islanders minor roles in metropolitan histories, in which their traditions
are picturesque but ultimately irrational and obsolete. It is impossible to
ignore that landscape, and hard to find an uncompromised stance. J W
Davidson’s prescription of island-oriented approaches was, I take it, a
reaction against “imperial history” (Davidson 1966). Since the 1960s
however, regional relations have been transformed by the demise or refor-
mulation of imperial structures, and the dichotomy between imperial and
independent perspectives no longer accommodates all options. Many
island groups have become independent nations, and others are beset by
what looks like recolonization. Thomas recommends a “more expansive
view of Pacific history as a series of local expressions of a broader colo-
nial history.” Colonialism is central to this formulation, and characteristic
of much current scholarship. “Subaltern historiography,” for example,
would discard not only the tropes of colonial discourse but also the
values and perspectives of dominant groups and classes, even if those
people profess to be—and are—anticolonial nationalists (Guha 1982–
1989). Increasingly sophisticated theories have yet to find an exit to the
nirvana of decolonization, this side of the end of history. Perhaps more
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that is so all-encompassing that it can paralyze. In brief, colonialism should
be decentered, in view of sea changes in Pacific Island societies both
before and after the colonial era. Here I beg questions by treating colo-
nialism not as a state of consciousness but as a series of historical phe-
nomena with beginnings, middles—and therefore ends. In that case, sev-
eral topics stand in need of urgent—and empirical—attention.
Andrew Bushnell (1993) has argued persuasively that demographic
collapse is “the most important ‘fact’ in Hawaiian history” and in the
modern record of several other societies. Arguments about the causes and
extent of depopulation are highly politicized. Howe (1984) concentrated
on Islanders’ resilience, but David Stannard (1989) targeted him for com-
placency in the face of Islanders’ destruction. Stannard’s argument is
morally supercharged, but its intellectual content resembles Alfred Crosby’s
Ecological Imperialism (1987), which proposed that the mere presence of
Europeans with their unacknowledged allies—germs, weeds, and animals
—inevitably wrought catastrophe. Stephen Kunitz (1994), insisting on
human choices in explaining the variations of morbidity and mortality,
was surprisingly silent on Stannard and explicitly hostile to Howe. In
brief, Howe and Kunitz are intellectual allies, as are Stannard and Crosby,
but in real life they are more deeply divided by their sense of sin than by
the weight they allow to natural and unnatural causes. Their disagree-
ments are so deeply rooted in moral as well as technical assumptions that
no one alive today will have the last word. Historians can confidently
seek an authoritative view, because there is no immediate risk of finding it.
At least two kinds of consequences flowed from depopulation. The
tragedy offered grist to the social Darwinist mill. It would be useful as
well as interesting to account for the plausibility of catastrophe in the
minds of European intellectuals of that day (and this): is schadenfreude
peculiar to western social psychology or an innately human enthusiasm?
Islanders’ responses also cry out for the investigation that Bronwen Dou-
glas (1994) has begun for New Caledonia. The coincidence of Christian
conversion and epidemic mortality is so close that it suggests eschatology.
It is intriguing that some Islanders, assuming that Europeans must possess
the antidote to their own toxins, explicitly denied their own agency.
Given that they raised the question, it seems only courteous to comb mis-
sion and traders’ records in search of their medical ideas and pharmaco-
poeias.
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century, it is especially difficult—perhaps inappropriate—to strike a bal-
ance between outsiders’ and insiders’ agency. At one extreme, some impe-
rial historians have portrayed the decay of Islanders’ authority as so
inevitable as to need no local explanation. What seems important in that
perspective is why particular islands fell to particular empires at particu-
lar times, and these questions are pursued through inter-imperial diplo-
matic sources (eg, Kennedy 1974). At the other extreme stands Howe’s
(1984) celebration of Islander agency. Its limitations were analyzed by
Meleiseâ: “To underestimate the force of settler intriguing and interna-
tional wrangling . . . in order to give priority of explanation to indigenous
political structures is taking the argument a great deal too far” (1985,
149). Howe’s optimism would deny today’s Islanders the political advan-
tage of victimhood; but neither approach offers room for explaining the
very general decline of autonomy.
Given the widespread agreement that colonialism was the main game
in the modern history of the islands, it is curious that metropolitan strate-
gies have generated nothing like the voluminous debate about the sources
of the “scramble for Africa.” Oskar Spate’s geopolitical trilogy (1979,
1983, 1988) stops short of the nineteenth century. There are persuasive
explanations for specific islands, addressing the agency of Islanders as
well as imperialists. Together with Scarr’s dissection of the Western Pacific
High Commission (1967), these volumes provide a full account of the
mechanics of the loss of sovereignty. What is mystifying is the rationale
for intervention. Crudely materialist explanations manifestly fail: Ger-
many, with the greatest commercial stake, was slowest to annex; France,
with the least economic involvement, was swiftest; sandalwood, bêche-
de-mer, and labor trading managed very well without a colonial umbrella.
Some jigsaw pieces may be found in the metropolitan centers rather
than the islands. These include the optimistic assumptions sustaining Brit-
ain’s informal empire and their erosion by political and economic setbacks.
The nature of Anglo-French rivalries may need to be invoked, to explain
how sectarian bitterness inflamed them. The extent and unique quality of
Japan’s explosion into a long-abandoned arena is becoming increasingly
clear; that, in turn, may help to explain the acquisitiveness of Australian
and New Zealand colonists—mirrored, again, by Caldoches (Merle 1995).
Beneath these strategic gambits lurks the transformation of European
(and settler) worldviews, so that unequal relations came to seem not
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ciled themselves to the partition and annexation of (for example) tropical
Africa, inhibitions dissolved elsewhere. Revulsion at imperial history
should allow a continuing interest in the dynamics of empire. Imperial
narratives need not erase the sequences of local events; rather, they sketch
contexts that were nonetheless real for being invisible within oceanic
horizons.
The nature of colonial power requires elucidation even more urgently
than when Thomas pointed to this lacuna (1990). The World Bank’s cer-
tainties about national and international economic management require
no elaboration. The bank’s current enthusiasm for the study of gover-
nance implies an equal certitude about policies and their implementation
—and the distinct threat of enforced political restructuring to match
economic restructuring. Can historians equal this confidence about gov-
ernment? More to the present point, I do not know how colonial govern-
ments functioned, although their nature and limitations become increas-
ingly evident as the colonial period recedes.
There are at least two cogent views of colonial governance. One treats
the state as a Leviathan, with a mission of modernization and develop-
ment (or capitalist penetration and underdevelopment) integrating iso-
lated communities into a global society and economy. This view empha-
sizes its monopoly of force, the power of its weapons, the discipline of its
police, its control over lawmaking and the language and agencies of gov-
ernment, its formidable external relations, and its capacity to regulate
access to land, to mobilize labor, and to regulate employment. Islanders
may have delayed and briefly derailed these projects, but they could nei-
ther halt nor reverse them. The contrary view posits encounters between
easily resistible forces and easily movable objects. In this fluid perspective,
for much of the colonial era, the state was less influential than mission
societies in terms of cultural and ideological change. Insofar as evangeli-
zation was a matter of negotiation, so was ideological transformation.
Similarly, the state relied on grossly undercapitalized planters and miners
to attempt economic transformation. Taken together, these constraints
limited most colonial states for most of their existence to little more than
a charade of order.
In effect there is an implicit debate about the effectiveness and agency
of colonial states. Can this debate be resolved? A measure of the effective-
ness of a government is its capacity to reorder the ownership and manage-
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visible. In the settler colonies of Hawai‘i, Australia, New Zealand, and
New Caledonia, the revolution was almost total; in other islands it suc-
ceeded only in formalizing communal ownership rather than individual
freehold; independent Tonga created the preconditions for peasantry; and
especially in the western Pacific the agrarian revolution was abandoned
almost before it began. Fiji stands alone in the thoroughness of the colo-
nial restructuring of land ownership and access, such that all other social
and economic relations were affected. Serious struggles over land and
other terrestrial resources broke out in Bougainville and in Irian Jaya only
in the 1960s, with large-scale mineral resource exploitation. Similar con-
flicts occurred even later in the rest of Papua New Guinea. A colonialism
that could not impose its values on land dealings can hardly be treated as
the organizing principle of all modern experience.
Consider another notorious colonial phenomenon, the invention of the
Native. During a strike in the New Guinea goldfields on the eve of the
Pacific War, management toyed with the idea of employing New Gui-
neans to replace Australian engine drivers who were unionized and holders
of certificates, and who formed a branch of the Australian Labor Party.
Management had empirical evidence that New Guinean employees could
do the jobs. Some had answered correctly all but one of the qualifying
questions asked of Australian engine drivers. (It is possible that New
Guineans were doing these jobs already, without recognition.) But before
such a revolutionary experiment could be endorsed by the Australian gov-
ernment, a theoretical question had to be resolved: could Natives perform
responsible tasks? The governments of India, Southern Rhodesia, and
South Africa were solemnly consulted as experts on Native abilities (adet
1935–1936). Natives were portrayed as an undifferentiated and homoge-
neous mass from Suez to Darwin. Of course some officials could tell one
Native from another. Some even formulated innate tribal characteristics.
Nor should the odious racism of inventing the Native be ignored. How-
ever, that ideology did inhibit the observation of colonial subjects as indi-
viduals or even as groups, and it limited the capacity of colonialism to
change lives.
Because colonialism dominates the academic landscape, decolonization
may have been underrated. The decentering of colonialism would suggest
that political independence is more than the charade Kwame Nkrumah
denounced in his influential but now unread Neo-Colonialism: The High-
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others whose focus is government take independence seriously, whereas
many anthropologists who adopt a village view do not. It is not for histo-
rians to side with one or the other perspective, but they should not dis-
miss the transformation of Natives into Citizens as legalistic flummery.
On one hand, the imposition of someone else’s citizenship can be deeply
disempowering. When Hawaiians became citizens of the United States they
lost the residue of political autonomy in exchange for status as an ethnic
minority. British citizenship facilitated the dispossession of New Zealand
Mâori. Irianese as Indonesian citizens became a poor, undeveloped minor-
ity inhabiting a remote (and “exotic”) province. Some small island com-
munities contrive to combine independent citizenship with continuing
access to the society and economy of former colonial powers. Even here,
citizenship is ambivalently profound, conferring equality at home and
marginality abroad. In brief, formal equality can be the badge of subordi-
nation. Citizenship may be more benign where a society—like Tiko—
defines itself as a free-standing entity in the world community; for good
or ill, it makes a difference.
In 1979 Hau‘ofa was a member of an Asian Development Bank review
of agriculture in the Pacific Islands. His observations led him to reflect
that, no matter what governments may say,
Pacific Islanders aim not for a rise from poverty, which in general they do not
have, but for a shift from one form of relative affluence to another. . . .
If the Pacific Island societies want to maintain their distinct ways of life and
their cultures . . . then the capitalistic system is certainly not the right one to
adopt. They have to find alternatives. But there are two problems. First, the
Pacific Islanders seem, by action although not by rhetoric, to have made the
choice already and opted for capitalism. By rhetoric, although much less by
action, they want to maintain distinct identities. Second, not one existing
model of society provides a real alternative for development in the islands; all
the models have been devised for countries and populations very much larger
than the tiny islands and small scattered populations of the Pacific. . . .
If they want a capitalist society and further westernisation, then they have
to take the risks required and adjust accordingly. Otherwise, they must reduce
their aspirations and devise other alternatives, for the present situation is
untenable. (Hau‘ofa 1980, 485–487; emphasis added)
This judgment bristles with the pessimism that “Our Sea of Islands” now
seeks to exorcise. There is continuity in the contrast between government
414 the contemporary pacific • fall 1997rhetoric and policies, and people’s choices and behavior; but notice that
smallness and scatteredness become visible in a postcolonial environment;
they were inescapable as long as Hau‘ofa and his colleagues accepted the
criteria required in reporting to the regional banker.
As this obscure episode implies, in many island groups it was indepen-
dence, more than colonialism, that admitted large infusions of capital and
initiated large-scale migration. Colonial regimes often shielded Islanders
from global markets, regional financial institutions, and global cultural
concerns. Independence and citizenship exposed Islanders, through elected
governments, to the defining rhetoric of development. Nor is exposure
always unwelcome. Elected officers and indigenous bureaucrats often
woo mining capital; village leaders, with some show of popular support,
enter joint ventures with foreign logging companies. Lest I paint too bleak
a portrait, I should also point to the management of marine resources,
despite the political and financial strength of deep-water fishing corpora-
tions. For good or ill, independence is not colonial tutelage, Citizens are
not Natives, and citizenship is not just a postscript to subject-hood. Only
with decolonization did the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank initiate discussions with governments on the conventions and indi-
ces for representing their economies and resources. It is the terms of this
engagement that trouble Hau‘ofa the scholar and Sailosi the bureaucrat.
What has this to do with misrepresentation? Remember that all repre-
sentation is approximation, informed by theory, designed to introduce
“order and intelligibility into data whose multiplicity and complexity
make them otherwise incomprehensible.” The function of disciplines is
not to eliminate error but to reduce it. At the same time, insofar as history
is popular as well as professional narrative, outsiders’ portrayals will usu-
ally be less persuasive than insiders’, independent of their scholarly qual-
ity. That consideration points foreign academics to topics that comple-
ment Islanders’ scholarship. Foreign scholars might, for example, take up
Hau‘ofa’s invitation to inquire into the nature of poverty or affluence,
remoteness or centrality, and to analyze the criteria that have been de-
ployed in making judgments. This debate elicits such a variety of opinions
that no perspective ought to be dismissed for fear of misrepresenting the
reality it seeks.
Outsiders will never desist from representing insiders: it is the nature of
independent entities to employ specialists to represent and misrepresent
each other. The role of academic historians is not the same as that of dip-
dialogue • denoon 415lomats whose tasks are properly prescribed by their governments. The
difference is vital, and it arises from disciplinary obligations as well as
juridical rights: obligations to range more broadly—and less responsi-
bly—than public servants. Misrepresentation is a risk attending the obli-
gation of irresponsibility. To promote Islanders’ participation in national,
regional, and global debates, not as Natives but as Citizens, perhaps the
best encouragement is to loosen the suffocating grip of colonialism as
residual institutions and as a state of mind, in order to observe and assess
the extent and the limits of independence and citizenship. Quite different
sensitivities will apply in representing people on whom an alien citizen-
ship has been imposed, but in most situations, foreign scholars’ obliga-
tions arise not only from the colonial past but also from the independent
present and from their own disciplines. It may not be enough, but histori-
ans might start by doing unto Others as they would have Others do unto
themselves.
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